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Abstract
This paper details the development and evalua-
tion of AstonTAC, an energy broker that success-
fully participated in the 2012 Power Trading Agent
Competition (Power TAC). AstonTAC buys electri-
cal energy from the wholesale market and sells it
in the retail market. The main focus of the paper
is on the broker’s bidding strategy in the wholesale
market. In particular, it employs Markov Decision
Processes (MDP) to purchase energy at low prices
in a day-ahead power wholesale market, and keeps
energy supply and demand balanced. Moreover,
we explain how the agent uses Non-Homogeneous
Hidden Markov Model (NHHMM) to forecast en-
ergy demand and price. An evaluation and analysis
of the 2012 Power TAC finals show that AstonTAC
is the only agent that can buy energy at low price in
the wholesale market and keep energy imbalance
low.
1 Introduction
Due to the privatisation and decentralisation of the electricity
provision system in many countries, electricity markets have
undergone several restructuring processes in order to improve
the market efficiency. Given the fact that the storage of elec-
tricity is very expensive, one of the key indicators of the elec-
tricity market efficiency is the imbalance between the energy
demand and energy supply. As a market participant, an en-
ergy broker that buys energy from energy generators and sells
to consumers in the retail market, plays a prominent role in
ensuring the market efficiency.
To this end, the Power Trading Agent Competition (Power
TAC) [Ketter et al., 2012] is provided by the Trading Agent
Competition (TAC) community [TAC Community, 2013],
which is an international research forum that promotes the
development of intelligent agents. The Power TAC simu-
lates an open and competitive electricity market where broker
agents compete against each other [Power TAC Community,
2013b]. In more detail, it models a wholesale market and
a retail market. Simultaneously, while the wholesale mar-
ket simulates energy markets such as the European or North
American wholesale energy markets, the retail market simu-
lates energy consumers. A distribution utility (DU) owns the
distribution network and ensures real time energy balancing
between supply and demand. The simulation environment
provides two types of customers: (1) elemental customers,
such as households, small businesses, small energy produc-
ers and electric vehicles; and (2) factored customers, such as
greenhouse complexes and manufacturing facilities. A Power
TAC game generally runs for about 60 virtual days or 1440
simulated hours. Every simulated hour lasts 5 seconds in real
world. Starting the game without money in its bank account,
the broker earns money by getting payment for the energy
sold and loses money by paying for the energy required or
market fees (e.g., the energy distribution fee, energy imbal-
ance fee, tariff publication fee, tariff revocation fee and the
bank interest on the debt). During the game, the bank always
loans the broker money to purchase energy and charges inter-
est. At the end of the simulation, the broker with the highest
bank balance wins the game.
During each simulated hour (time slot), an energy broker
can perform the following activities:
• place bids or/and asks on the wholesale market. The
wholesale market operates as a periodic double auction
market where it is cleared once every simulated hour.
Broker agents can buy and sell energy for future delivery
up to 24 hours ahead (thus called day-ahead).
• determine, publish and modify energy tariffs for the re-
tail market. The broker can publish two types of tariff:
production and consumption tariffs. The power TAC en-
vironment enables the design of tariffs with real world
tariff features (e.g., periodic payments, tiered rates, sign-
up bonuses, dynamic pricing). These features enable
brokers to manage their customer portfolio.
Furthermore, the Power TAC server provides the following
information to energy brokers during the game:
• Public information that is available to all the brokers.
During each time slot, a broker receives market clearing
prices and the cleared volume, current weather situation
(temperature, cloud cover, wind speed and wind direc-
tion) and the weather forecast for the next 24 simulated
hours. For every six time slots, all brokers receive in-
formation about all the newly published tariffs. Each
Power TAC game is initialised with a setup game, which
provides initial data for 360 time slots. The initial data
includes the hourly power consumption and production
volume for each customer, the clearing price and cleared
volume in the wholesale market, and the hourly weather
report.
• Private information that is available only to the broker
in question. This includes successful bids and asks in
the wholesale market and the information about the tariff
that are already published on behalf of the broker. Only
the broker that owns a published tariff receives informa-
tion about the tariff. This tariff information may be cus-
tomer subscription, withdrawals or payments. General
information such as cash position, total energy distribu-
tion or energy imbalance is also considered as private.
Against this background, we have developed and evaluated
an intelligent broker agent called AstonTAC. The focus of the
paper is on the Markov Decision Process (MDP) model that
the agent uses for the energy bidding in the wholesale market.
In order to apply the MDP model, AstonTAC forecasts the en-
ergy demand and the energy price using Non-Homogeneous
Hidden Markov Models (NHHMM) [Bengio and Frasconi,
1995; Bishop, 2006]. During the Power TAC competition
in December 2012, AstonTAC performed stably and success-
fully. Moreover, it was the only agent able to buy energy at a
low price in the wholesale market and keep the energy imbal-
ance low. The key contribution of our work is: (1) the energy
bidding strategy for the energy broker and (2) the forecast
models for energy demand and price.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section
2 presents related work on energy trading. Section 3 describes
our agent. Section 4 evaluates the agent and the trading strat-
egy. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Work
A vast number of techniques have been proposed to deal with
energy trading, energy demand forecast and price forecast.
In [Song et al., 2000], an optimal bidding strategy for
energy suppliers was presented. The MDP presented in
[Song et al., 2000] assumes to have complete information
about the competing agents. However, the Power TAC en-
vironment considers any successful bids and asks as pri-
vate information. Using the HMM to define the state of
the environment, our MDP indirectly considers the behaviour
of the other market participants. Most of the publications
about the bidding strategy in an energy market consider
only the supplier viewpoint [Tellidou and Bakirtzis, 2006;
Bach et al., 2012]. In contrast to the energy broker, the en-
ergy supplier is only concerned with selling all the available
energy but not with the appropriate volume that would enable
the supply and demand to be balanced.
The techniques used in energy demand and price fore-
casting can be classified in two trends: times series mod-
els and machine learning. The commonly used time se-
ries models include Autoregressive Integrated Moving Aver-
age (ARIMA) [Cancelo et al., 2008; Contreras et al., 2003;
Conejo et al., 2005], Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) [Garcia et al., 2005; Zheng et
al., 2005], structural time series models [Harvey and Koop-
man, 1993] and multiple regression models [Ramanathan
et al., 1997]. The machine learning techniques include
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) [Mandal et al., 2005;
Zhang and Luh, 2005; Gao et al., 2000; Yao et al., 2000],
Wavelet transform and Kalman filter [Nguyen and Nabney,
2010]. HMM provides us a more robust and faster way for
generating prediction models at run time. Our HMMs auto-
matically consider the intra-weekly and intra-daily behaviour
of the energy demand and price. Moreover, by updating our
HMMs transition matrices during the game, HMMs adapt to
environment changes, which is a desirable feature of Aston-
TAC.
3 AstonTAC MDP
Given the complexity, and the dynamic and uncertain nature
of the Power TAC environment, AstonTAC is built to adapt
to environmental changes and to act autonomously during the
simulation. For every time slot, AstonTAC employs MDP
models to determine the bids (price, volume and time slot)
submitted to the wholesale market. In order to calculate the
volume to buy, AstonTAC needs to know the demand con-
sumption of the contracted customers and the energy produc-
tion of some of the contracted customers. In the Power TAC
environment, some customers are able to produce electrical
energy using renewable energy sources and to sell their en-
ergy production to the broker agent. Thus, the net customer
demand consumption is the difference between the energy
consumed and the energy produced. In order to set a bid-
ding price to buy energy and the time slot for delivery, it is
vital to predict the clearing price, so that the agent can buy
the energy when the clearing price is low.
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of AstonTAC MDP.
The Clearing Price Predictor (see Section 3.4) predicts the
clearing prices of the wholesale market. The Customer En-
ergy Production Predictor (see Section 3.2) predicts the en-
ergy consumption of the contracted customers and the Cus-
tomer Energy Consumption Predictor (see Section 3.1) pre-
dicts the energy production of the contracted customers. The
predictors use the Power TAC Server information (both pub-
lic and private information described in Section 1). The cus-
tomer energy consumption and production predictors are used
by the Customer Energy Demand Manager (see Section 3.3)
to determine the volume of the net energy demand to buy each
hour. Based on the predicted clearing price and the net en-
ergy demand, AstonTAC MDP decides the bids to place in
the wholesale market. AstonTAC MDP aims to enable the
agent to buy energy at a low price and keep the supply and
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Figure 1: AstonTAC MDP Architecture
demand volume as equal as possible.
3.1 Customer Energy Consumption Predictor
AstonTAC uses Non-Homogeneous Hidden Markov Models
(NHHMM) to predict the customer energy consumption. Our
HMM is considered to be non-homogeneous, because the
transition probability between two states is time dependent.
The following explains the hidden states, the training and the
update of the NHHMM model at run time.
Hidden States
The historical data from the setup game (see Section 1) are
used to determine the hidden states of the customer energy
consumption. The hidden states are computed at the begin-
ning of the game for all the customers that are able to con-
sume energy. The net energy usage of each customer rep-
resents the observed variables. We use Matlab’s implemen-
tation of the k-means clustering algorithm to determine the
hidden states from the observed variables.
Time slot 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Net usage 7882.4 7445.3 7585.2 9091.6 8316.3 10088.5 10696.2
Hidden
states
2 1 2 3 2 4 4
Cluster
centroids
8000 7000 8000 9000 8000 10000 10000
Table 1: An Example of K-Means Clustering of Customer
Consumption.
Table 1 shows an example of k-means (k=4) clustering
with seven observed random variables (net usage). Matlab
k-means provides the clusters 1, 2, 3 and 4 which are also
the hidden states. Moreover, k-means provides the centroid
of each cluster, which we use for the prediction.
After defining the hidden states, a graphical representation
of the HMM can be drawn. Figure 2 shows an example of
a graphical representation of the latent states and observed
variables where x0, ..., x4 represent the net energy consump-
tion of the customer. In order to predict the values of the ob-
servations x0, ..., x4, one needs to predict the state of the latent
variables z0, ..., z4.
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Figure 2: Graphical Representation of the HMM model for
Energy Consumption. The nodes represent the random vari-
ables and the arrows the dependencies.
Training of the Consumption NHHMM
The training of an HMM model is essentially the calculation
of the transition matrix and of the emission matrix. The tran-
sition matrix is the matrix of transition probabilities, which
is denoted by: given i, j, zt−1 and zt the hidden states; k and
xt the observed variables. Tij = p(zt = j|zt−1 = i) where the
time tN, 0 ≤ Tij ≤ 1 with
∑
j
Tij = 1. The emission matrix
is the matrix of emission probabilities, which is denoted by:
Ejk = p(xt = k|zt = j) where the time tN, 0 ≤ Ejk ≤ 1 with∑
k
Ejk = 1. Our HMM is considered to be non-homogeneous,
because the transition probability between two states is time
dependent. This means that it is possible to have two en-
ergy consumption states i and j so that: p(zt = j|zt−1 = i) 6=
p(zt+2 = j|zt+1 = i).
Prediction and Update of the Consumption NHHMM
The aim of the prediction is to obtain an approximation of
the consumption value of each customer. Instead of predict-
ing the observed values x0, ..., x4, we only need to predict the
hidden states z0, ..., z4. The predicted values of the observed
variables are the corresponding k-mean centroids. The result-
ing transition matrix is a 24 × 20 × 20 matrix where there is
a 20 × 20 transition matrix for each hour of the day. Thus,
at each hour of the day, considering the current state of the
consumption, the predicted values for the future hours can be
calculated using the resulting transition matrix.
After each prediction of the energy consumption, the agent
receives the actual values of the customer consumption from
the Power TAC server. AstonTAC records these values for
each customer, computes the corresponding hidden states and
updates the transition matrix with the new information. The
HMM transition tables are updated hourly (each simulated
hour). The update does not require running k-mean cluster-
ing.
3.2 Customer Energy Production Predictor
AstonTAC uses Input-Output HMM (IOHMM) [Bengio and
Frasconi, 1995] to predict the customer energy production.
The IOHMM is a form of NHHMM where inputs variables
condition the states of the hidden variables or/and the value
of the observed variables.
There are two types of energy production in the simulation
environment: solar energy production and wind energy pro-
duction. The solar energy production is influenced by tem-
perature and cloud cover; and the wind energy production is
influenced by wind speed and wind direction. The weather
states are the inputs of our IOHMM model. Hidden states
of the energy production are determined using the same ap-
proach employed for the energy consumption forecast (see
Section 3.1). The states of the weather are also determined
using the same technique: Power TAC server provides initial
weather data that are sent to Matlab for a k-means clustering.
For each of the energy production types, the weather states
are defined as a combination of the corresponding parameter
states. For example, considering the wind production, if four
states are defined for the wind direction and four states for
the wind speed, then the resulting number of weather states is
sixteen. Since Power TAC provides during the game a rudi-
mentary weather forecast for the next 24 simulated hours, we
use the predicted weather values to predict the most probable
hidden states of the energy production. The predicted val-
ues of the observed random variables are the corresponding
k-means centroids. The IOHMM conditioned transition ma-
trix is also updated during the game using the information
(weather report and energy production values) provided by
the game server.
3.3 Customer Energy Demand Manager
The customer energy demand manager calculates the total re-
maining energy to buy, which is the net customer demand less
the energy bought for that time slot so far in the game. From
the energy broker viewpoint, for each time slot, the net pre-
dicted customer energy demand that has to be satisfied is the
difference between the predicted energy volume consumption
and the predicted energy volume production. The energy bro-
ker needs to buy energy from the wholesale market only if
there is a positive difference. Furthermore, the energy bro-
ker has 24 trading hours to buy the energy volume in order to
cover the predicted demand. This means that for every hour
(up to 24 hours) ahead the broker can buy a portion of the en-
ergy demand. The actual volume to buy for a specified time
slot is determined by the MDP model.
3.4 Clearing Price Predictor
AstonTAC uses an NHHMM to predict the wholesale market
clearing price. In the wholesale market, the market is cleared
every hour for the 24 hours ahead. We design a 24×20×20
conditioned transition matrix to predict the hidden states of
the clearing prices. For each hour ahead, there is a 20×20
transition matrix. The calculation of the hidden states, the
training of NHHMM, prediction of the observed values and
the update of the NHHMM are similar to the methods used
for the energy consumption NHHMM (see Section 3.1).
3.5 AstonTAC MDP Model
Upon receiving the predicted energy price for each time slot
and the remaining energy to buy in the wholesale market,
the AstonTAC MDP decides the bids to place for each hour
ahead. By using the MDP model, AstonTAC aims to buy en-
ergy at a low price for the time slots desired and to keep the
imbalance as low as possible. This subsection explains the
four parameters of our MDP and the computation of the opti-
mal value and policy.
Parameters of the AstonTAC MDP
The parameters of the AstonTAC MDP are defined by the
states, actions, state transition probabilities and reward func-
tion.
Set of states (S): The state is represented by the number
of hours ahead, the remaining quantity of energy needed and
the predicted clearing price. The remaining needed quantity
is denoted as a ratio as Rr = qrt/qnk where 0 ≤ Rr ≤ 1 ; qrt
is the remaining quantity of energy needed at time t. qnk is
the predicted quantity of energy needed that satisfies the cus-
tomer demand at a particular time slot k in the game. t is the
time ahead or the time remaining and 0 < t ≤ T ; T is the finite
horizon time T = 24. qrt is provided by the customer energy
demand manager. The predicted clearing price is mapped in
24 price states of the MDP. The predicted clearing price is
classified in one of 24 states where the best (lowest) prices
are in state 1 and the highest price in state 24.
Set of actions (A): The MDP action is a bid that is placed
in the wholesale market. The bid is a combination of the bid-
ding price and the bidding volume for a time slot in the game.
For each time slot, the MDP decides the bid to place for the
future 24 time slots that are available for trading in the whole-
sale market. Bid prices are the predicted clearing prices pro-
vided by the clearing price predictor. The energy volume of
the bids are decided by the MDP. The bid energy volume is
represented as the ratio of the remaining energy needed that
should be ordered. For instance, AstonTAC MDP can choose
to place bids with 10, 20 or 80% of the remaining energy
needed as bid energy volume.
Transition probability (P ): Probability (P (s′|s, a)) is that
the AstonTAC MDP transitions from one state s  S to another
s′  S after taking the action a A.
Reward function (R): The agent receives two types of re-
ward: an immediate reward for buying at low price and a de-
layed reward for the energy balancing after 24 decision steps.
The immediate reward is given to the agent according to bid
setting: bidding price and bidding volume. For example, if
the predicted clearing price is high, the agent will receive a
positive reward for buying a low energy volume and nega-
tive reward for buying high energy volume. The value of the
delayed reward is based on the imbalance ratio at the end of
the 24 steps. The simulation environment informs the agent
each hour about the value of the energy imbalance. In order
to guarantee a low energy supply and demand imbalance, the
highest positive reward is received when the imbalance is the
lowest (i.e., between to 0 and 5%).
Optimal Value and Policy
AstonTAC MDP is a combination of a state-action rewards
MDP [Littman, 1996; Singh, 1993] and a finite horizon MDP
[Watkins, 1989; Li and Littman, 2005]. The overall strategy
is the sequence of the decisions that can be made in order to
maximise the total rewards. This overall strategy is denoted
by the policy function pi where pi : S → A. Following the
policy pi, at each state s of a run, the agent takes the decision
and transitions the system with a probability of P (s′|s, a) to the
next state s′ as follows. Let nd be the total number of states
to visit in the run.
• At state s0 and time t = 0, take action a0
• Go to s1, with a transition probability of P (s1|s0, a0)
• At state s1 and time t = 1, take action a1
• Go to si, at time t = i with a transition probability of
P (si|si−1, ai−1), where 2 6 i ≤ nd and i N
MDP enables the agent to find the optimal policy pi∗(s) that
maximises the expected cumulative rewards at state s. Let
Vpi(s) denote the cumulative expected reward function that
starts from state s = s0 at time t = 0 and uses a policy pi(s).
The best policy pi(s) at state s is therefore the one that has
the maximal value of Vpi(s). The maximal value of Vpi(s) is
denoted by V ∗(s). We define the AstonTAC MDP as follows
given pi(s) and 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 with T = 24.
Vpi(s) = E [R(s, a0) + R(s1, a1) + R(s2, a2) + ...+ R(s23, a23)]
at time t = 0.
V
∗
t (s) = maxa
Rt(s, a) +∑
s′
Pt(s
′|s, a)V ∗t+1(s′)

where a A, s  S and s′  S.
pi
∗
t (s) = argmaxa
Rt(s, a) +∑
s′
Pt(s
′|s, a)V ∗t+1(s′)

where a A, s  S and s′  S.
The computation of pi∗ and V ∗ requires the model pa-
rameters (reward function, expected total pay-off and tran-
sition probabilities) to be available. AstonTAC MDP learns
the model parameters online using a technique inspired by
the Monte Carlo Methods presented in [Sutton and Barton,
2000]. The agent learns from on-line experience and decides
by comparing the average of experienced returns at each state.
During the simulation, AstonTAC uses the pay-off average to
decide about the optimal action to take instead of computing
the transition probabilities and the expected reward values.
The learning occurs at the end of each episode (24 simulated
hours) after the delayed reward for the energy balancing is de-
fined. At the beginning of the training, the initial policy that
will be evaluated follows the immediate reward setting: buy
the maximum of the needed energy if the predicted clearing
price of the time slot is the lowest and lowest energy volume
if the price is predicted to be the highest.
4 Evaluation
Our evaluation is composed of two parts: the results from the
2012 Power TAC and our analysis of the tournament games.
4.1 Competition Results
The 2012 Power TAC finals [Power TAC Community, 2013a]
consisted of 184 games with three individual competitions:
63 games with two players, 105 games with four players and
16 games with seven players. The winner of the compe-
tition is the broker agent with the highest normalised total
profit of all games. Table 2 shows the result of the compe-
tition. This table presents the accumulated profit for each
broker in seven-player (annotated Size 1), four-player (anno-
tated Size 2) and two-player (annotated Size 3) games. Con-
sidering the non-normalised total, AstonTAC is second af-
ter CrocodileAgent. According to the normalised total, As-
tonTAC is third with a score of -1.217 after CrocodileAgent
(with a score of 7.348) and SotonPower (with a score of -
1.215). Although CrocodileAgent achieved the highest score,
we fear that its success took advantage of the weaknesses
of the Power TAC server. Its strategy is not realistic. For
instance, when the CrocodileAgent offered tariffs with very
high rates, it still attracted a lot of customers for a long pe-
riod in the game.
In fact, among all the games played with SotonPower, As-
tonTAC outperforms SotonPower in 63% of the games (27
out of 43) and outperforms MinerTA in 60% of the games (28
out of 47). Moreover, AstonTAC won all two-player games
against SotonPower or MinerTA. Table 3 compares the per-
formance of AstonTAC with SotonPower (3(a)) and MinerTA
(3(b)) in two-player games.“Energy Demand” represents the
average energy demand (in MWh) of the broker agent in all
the two-player games. This is the sum of the net energy usage
for all customer consumption. “Energy Bought” represents
Agent
Name
Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Total (Non
normalised)
Total (nor-
malised)
Crocodile
Agent
1.26E+10 6.31E+10 2.74E+10 1.03E+11 7.348
AstonTAC 3.11E+06 9.58E+07 5.00E+07 1.49E+08 -1.217
Soton
Power
1.03E+07 6.68E+07 6.22E+07 1.39E+08 -1.215
MinerTA 2.33E+07 6.48E+07 1.83E+07 1.06E+08 -1.217
Mertacor -5.11E+05 -1.13E+07 4.98E+06 -6.79E+06 -1.227
LARGE
power
-4.16E+07 -5.25E+07 1.01E+07 -8.40E+07 -1.238
UTest 1.55E+06 -6.67E+07 -4.68E+07 -1.12E+08 -1.235
Table 2: Result of the Power TAC Tournament
the average energy volume (in MWh) the agent bought from
the wholesale market. “Imbalance” shows the average hourly
supply demand imbalance ratio (in %). The hourly imbal-
ance ratio is computed by dividing the absolute hourly im-
balance for each broker by the hourly customer energy con-
sumption. “Buy Price” is the average price (in EURO/MWh)
of the successful bids of the broker agent. “Average Cash”
represents the average profit (in EURO) the broker has at the
end of the game. According to Table 3, AstonTAC has a big-
ger market share than its opponents: an average of 92.01%
in the games against SotonPower and 98.81% in the games
against MinerTA. These two-player games demonstrate that
although AstonTAC has more than 92% of the market share,
it is able to keep the energy imbalance lower than 10.5%. So-
tonPower and MinerTA are able to buy energy at lower price
in the wholesale market but are not able to control the market
or to keep the energy imbalance lower than 80%.
Agent
Name
Energy
Demand
Energy
Bought
Imbalance
(%)
Buy
Price
Average
Cash
(a)
AstonTAC 78478.84 79821.74 10.40 34.25 3.63E+06
SotonPower 6810.82 14212.93 128.86 27.17 1.06E+06
(b)
AstonTAC 85492.29 84661.96 10.43 33.98 3.66E+06
MinerTA 1025.30 1662.22 80.10 26.99 3.43E+05
Table 3: Two-Player Games Result with (a) SotonPower and
(b) MinerTA
4.2 Competition Game Analysis
To further investigate the performance of AstonTAC in the
wholesale market, we analysed the games in Power TAC fi-
nals. We mainly focused on the performance of AstonTAC in
terms of the bidding in wholesale market and balancing sup-
ply and demand. Table 4 shows the brokers’ performance in
all successful games.1 Mertacor did well in keeping the en-
ergy imbalance low. MinerTA and SotonPower managed to
buy at low prices. AstonTAC performs well: both in energy
balance and in buying at low price. As shown in Table 4, As-
tonTAC is the only agent that can buy energy at low price in
1A successful game is a game that lasts over 1320 time slots
which is the minimum duration of a game.
Agent
Name
Energy
Demand
Energy
Bought
Imbalance
(%)
Buy
Price
No. of
Games
AstonTAC 29009.72 34731.37 21.52 29.22 67
Mertacor 40530.53 40350.92 18.16 51.84 69
LARGE
power
22094.77 23434.50 35.21 37.99 71
MinerTA 3477.17 4356.54 75.08 17.44 74
SotonPower 9934.13 17683.05 146.29 19.26 68
Crocodile
Agent
25099.90 63609.87 425.70 32.46 68
Table 4: Brokers’ Performance in Wholesale Market
the wholesale market and keep energy imbalance low. The
fact that using the MDP, AstonTAC has an energy imbalance
of 21.52% indirectly shows that the NHHMMs used by As-
tonTAC MDP for energy production and consumption pro-
vide acceptable prediction values.
In order to evaluate AstonTAC MDP and the clearing price
prediction, we analyse the wholesale market performance of
several agents in a randomly chosen game 418 and the result
is shown in Figure 3. Figure 3(a) shows the average clearing
price in each hour ahead, Figures 3(b) and 3(c) illustrate the
average volume of energy bought by each broker.
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Figure 3: Wholesale Market Performance in Game 418
According to Figure 3(a), the average energy clearing
prices are the highest at time slots two and twenty-four hours
ahead. The lowest clearing prices are observed at time slots
one, and between three and eleven hours ahead. From Fig-
ures 3(b) and 3(c), we can see Mertacor, CrocodileAgent and
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Figure 4: Prediction of the Energy Consumption in Game 562
LargePower do not adapt their bidding behaviour to the mar-
ket clearing price. In contrast, AstonTAC, SotonPower and
MinerTA try to adapt their bidding behaviour to the clearing
price. Thus, agents that are not adapting to the wholesale
market may end up buying energy at high price and adap-
tive agents can manage to buy less energy at high price. This
is the case for AstonTAC and MinerTA which buy less en-
ergy volume at time two and twenty-four hours ahead. Al-
though SotonPower adapts its bidding behaviour to the mar-
ket, it ends up buying more energy twenty-four hours ahead
when the energy is high. Using the MDP to balance the retail
market, AstonTAC is able to buy less energy at high price and
buy a constant volume of energy otherwise. The fact that As-
tonTAC buys less energy at time two and twenty-four hours
ahead, demonstrates that the NHHMM price prediction pro-
vides a reliable clearing price prediction.
To provide some details about the performance of our pre-
diction techniques in the PowerTAC environment, we decide
to analyse a randomly chosen game with two brokers. We
observe the performance of our prediction one hour ahead
over several days. Figure 4 shows the performance of the
NHHMM for the forecast of the energy consumption in KWh
for a customer called “MedicalCenter” (Customer ID: 513)
during the game 562 between time slots 1131 and 1298. The
standard deviation of the prediction is 501.24 with a mean
value of 5027.46 of the observations. In general, the standard
deviation of our NHHMM predictions is 10% of the mean
value of the observations.
5 Conclusion
This paper details the design, implementation and evaluation
of the AstonTAC MDP. The focus of the paper is on the bid-
ding in the energy wholesale market. Through analysing the
actual tournament, we found out that AstonTAC is the only
agent that can buy energy at low price in the wholesale market
and keep energy imbalance low. AstonTAC MDP is designed
independently from the Power TAC simulation environment.
Moreover, the AstonTAC MDP provides a concrete bidding
approach for the future energy market where the energy de-
mand will be more satisfied by renewable energy sources.
Thus, the approach used in this paper could be generalised
to other energy wholesale markets in real world. For the fu-
ture, we plan to improve the prediction techniques for energy
demand and price in order to improve the performance of our
MDP.
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